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Pricing and Carbon Emission Reduction Strategies for Vertically Differentiated Firms under Cap-and-Trade Regulation with Consumers’ Preference

时间 :2019年07月04日 浏覽:

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報告人簡介:李濤教授在美國紐約大學和德州大學達拉斯分校分別獲得碩士學位,並于2012年獲得德州大學達拉斯分校供應鏈管理專業博士學位。2012年参加美國聖克拉拉大學Leveay商學院,並獲終身教職。他的主要研究領域是供應鏈管理。他在管理科學與工程領域的國際頂級雜志Production and Operations Management、European Journal of Operational Research、International Journal of Production Economics、International Journal ...

報告人簡介:李濤教授在美國紐約大學和德州大學達拉斯分校分別獲得碩士學位,並于2012年獲得德州大學達拉斯分校供應鏈管理專業博士學位。2012年参加美國聖克拉拉大學Leveay商學院,並獲終身教職。他的主要研究領域是供應鏈管理。他在管理科學與工程領域的國際頂級雜志Production and Operations ManagementEuropean Journal of Operational ResearchInternational Journal of Production EconomicsInternational Journal of Production Research等發表多篇文章,也是國際頂級期刊國際頂級期刊Production and Operations Management資深編委。他曾經在紐約州立大學布法羅分校、德州大學達拉斯分校任教,並在多家公司如Procter & GambleMotorola in ChinaFujiTsu (Tianjin) ElectronicsWoodward (Tianjin) Controls等任職,有豐富的教學、科研和實踐經驗。

報告簡介:This research develops price and low-carbon competition models for vertically differentiated firms, which consists of one high-quality manufacturer (HM) and one low-quality manufacturer (LM). We investigate how manufacturers’ low-carbon behaviors are affected by factors such as the cap-and-trade regulation, consumers’ low-carbon preference and competing environment. Without the cap-and-trade regulation, as expected, we find that a manufacturer’s price and emission reduction rate are always strategic complements. Under the cap-and-trade regulation, however, a manufacturer’s price and emission reduction rate may be strategic substitutes when the carbon market price is high. Moreover, contrary to our intuition, our result shows that in most cases, a higher unit carbon quota can motivate the manufacturers to increase emission reduction rate. We demonstrate that, the implementation of cap-and-trade regulation cannot always motivate the manufacturer to increase his emission reduction rate. Furthermore, whether the carbon policy is conducive to the improvement of social welfare depends on the reasonable setting of carbon quota.

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